Conditional Love? The US & NATO after the US National Security Strategy
US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker talks at the Doha Forum
US Ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, spoke on Saturday (6th Dec) at the Doha Forum, 24 hours after the US published its National Security Strategy, which naturally was the focus of the questions he was asked and his remarks. It was illuminating. The main thing that struck me was the unequivocal commitment to Article 5. Asked by Chatham House’s Bronwen Maddox whether NATO countries should be confident the US would respond to a Russian attack triggering Article 5, he replied:
“Absolutely. Article 5 is iron clad…” and he suggested Russia would be making a “…foolish mistake…[to]…try to challenge the NATO alliance.” Which seemed to underline the point that the US would fight too. Whitaker discussed the strength of the Eastern Flank of NATO, and how:
“The United States and all NATO allies take our Article 5 commitments in the treaty very seriously. And we practice, we exercise, we have plans, and we are always looking for ways to get stronger and even increase deterrence from where we’re at today.”
He argued that deterrence would hold. That the likelihood of a direct Russian attack on NATO was “very low”. Noting that “Russia is very reckless and ultimately you can’t predict what they will do.” And expressing his concern that Russia’s “…hybrid threats and activities have been well documented”. He seemed more concerned about miscalculation, than a deliberate attack and challenge to Article 5.
Contrast this with Russia’s claim that the vision in the US NSS is largely consistent with Russia’s worldview. We could concede this is true in its realist, and state-centric, vice more liberal internationalist, and legal view of a world regulated through international institutions. However, this should not be equated with it being a concession to Russia’s irredentism and interests, as Putin perceives them - his explicitly irridentist ‘Novorossiya’ or desire for a free hand in, and perhaps the right to seize and directly rule, Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’. Nor an acceptance of the way Putin’s Russia seeks to advance those interests and aims. Whitaker as least was clear in rejecting both.
Whitaker’s focus was the future. It was uncompromisingly transactional. He repeatedly pressed NATO countries on the need to meet their 5% commitment. He explained that at the recent NATO Summit, Spain had committed to contributing forces to NATO that he felt would likely require them to spend 5%, but they had claimed in negotiations they could provide for less. Whitaker’s sentiment was that if they could, great. But the US would expect them to spend what it took to deliver what they had promised. He believed NATO nations would all meet the 5% commitment. Whitaker’s remarks contained his assurance that:
“NATO is not only strong now but that as NATO countries met their 5% commitment, it would be “…not only the strongest alliance in history to plan up, but really a dramatic force to be reckoned with.”
To achieve this would require an alliance that was less dependent on US security guarantees, hence 5% GDP spending, but that the decreasing dependence would make U.S. commitment and assurance easier to continue to grant. The consequences of not doing so were implicit.
Consistent with the US requirement that allies globally share the burden of their own defence more equally, he argued that 5% spending on GDP needed to be ‘the worldwide standard’ for US Allies.
Relatedly, Whitaker reaffirmed the strategic refocus of the US NSS: the US cannot remain the world’s rapid-response fire brigade. Allies in Europe and the Middle East should become “net security providers”, interoperable with US forces and capable of regional crisis management without automatic American intervention.
On the politically charged areas—free speech, Europe’s relative economic decline, and trade negotiations - Whitaker walked a narrow line. He pressed Europe to defend open expression, argued as the NSS does that Europe must not become an economic backwater. The US wants an economically dynamic Europe as ally, not just a place to which it is tied only by kinship bonds of family heritage, culture, sentiment, and for admiration of its history, food and wine. At the same time Whitaker declined to explain statements by Donald Trump on for example taking over Canada (which he was asked about directly) noting instead the President’s instinct for leverage in hard trade negotiations. Whitaker and the US wanted European nations whose relative power in the international system was increasing, not decreasing, consistent with its aims for greater burden sharing. Trump’s aims were reasonable, he implied, and the means needed to be seen for what they were - the most effective way to mutually beneficial ends.
On Ukraine, Whitaker framed the moment as the closest yet to a negotiated peace, mediated—formally or informally—by the United States. Peace “at any cost” is off the table; any settlement must be acceptable to Kyiv. But he underlined that shadow diplomacy is active, high-level, and continuous – and sometimes uncomfortable. Again, we need to be more concerned with the outcome than the process.
The broader vision was a NATO that is stronger because its constituent parts are stronger; a Europe that pays for and fields the force it needs to deter; and an America that leads, but no longer carries, the alliance. A shift from dependency to reciprocity. Blunt and uncompromising. Unequivocal in its commitment to Article 5 today, more equivocal on how sustainable that would be if other NATO nation’s don’t contribute to their own defence as the US expects. Conditional love.